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ABSTRACT 
The safety review process for NASA spacecraft flown 
on Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) has been guided 
by NASA-STD 8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Payload Safety Review Process Standard. The standard 
focused primarily on the safety approval required to 
begin pre-launch processing at the launch site. 
Subsequent changes in the contractual, technical, and 
operational aspects of payload processing, combined 
with lessons-learned supported a need for the re-
assessment of the standard. This has resulted in the 
formation of a NASA ELV Payload Safety Program. 
This program has been working to address the 
programmatic issues that will enhance and supplement 
the existing process, while continuing to ensure the 
safety of ELV payload activities. 
PREFACE 
This is a factual (though at times tongue-in-cheek) 
account of payload safety program activities. Any 
similarities to Dorothy's trip to Oz, and the events and 
characters she encountered along the way, are purely 
coincidental. Fortunately for Dorothy, her adventure 
was only a dream. 
NOTE: The views expressed in this paper are solely 
those of the author, and do not necessarily represent 
those of NASA or its employees. 
1. THE HISTORY 
Not unexpectedly, a collection of individual, common 
place events led to the present situation. NASA-STD 
8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload 
Safety Review Process Standard, released in 1998, was 
the official beginning. Developed through an aptly 
named process called SPAT - Safety Process Action 
Team - this standard was to define the never before 
documented safety approval process for NASA ELV 
payload processing. It was the result of the efforts of a 
dedicated team of hardworking, intelligent individuals, 
each with one goal in mind.., satisfying their own 
interests. At least as an outsider that was my impression; 
as an ad hoc member of the team working for the
45 Space Wing at the time (with no dreams of rainbows), 
the inside story was that it would give payload project 
safety personnel some representation against those 
feared safety guys when they came to process at 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Was it successful? 
Surprisingly, yes -- for everyone. 
NASA-STD 8719.8 accomplished many important 
things. It established payload safety working groups 
(PSWG), a distinguished body composed of safety 
personnel representing the various organizations 
including the payload contractor, spacecraft center, 
launch vehicle, processing facility, and Air Force Range 
Safety. It also defined typical milestones for submittal 
of safety data, and an approval process of the payload 
safety documentation. We were brave in those days, and 
there wasn't an issue we didn't think we couldn't handle 
ourselves. 
We were also tremendously successful for years, 
surviving all the other external influences such as re-
organizations, NASA initiatives (e.g., Faster, better, 
cheaper), organizational restructuring, changes in 
management, and organizational re-alignments. With no 
real visibility, we avoided many obstacles. 
Unfortunately, the formal implementation of the 
standard was virtually non-existent and its presence in a 
contract seemed to be the rare exception. With limited 
support, we imposed it on projects the best we could; 
there seemed to be a 'gentlemen's agreement' that this 
was something good. 
Often we would be confronted with a unique situation, 
not addressed by the standard. Left to our own methods, 
we addressed the issue and our solutions, and although 
they maybe not have been perfect or well documented, 
we accomplished our safety objectives. We avoided all 
the bureaucracy, management interference, politics, turf 
battles, etc. that are known to exist outside of NASA. 
We knew what the issues were, what had to be done, and 
how to fix it. OUR process actually worked.
1.1 The B.C. Years - (i.e., Before CALIPSO) 
It's hard to pinpoint the exact time when the speed 
bumps appeared in the 'yellow brick road'. Again, there 
iiVidtl ëifthat was iliroot cause. A - 
combination of the Air Force Range Safety reducing 
their oversight to the public safety of civil and 
commercial launches (effectively transferring the safety 
responsibilities), and increased competition between 
spacecraft contractors and their efforts to maintain 
market share were probably the major contributors. 
Overhead cuts were made and trickled down resulting in 
smaller safety staffs. Lower paid (inexperienced) safety 
personnel were hired to replace those fortunate enough 
to embark on more fulfilling career paths (if they were 
replaced at all), decreasing the quality of safety 
assessments, timeliness of data submittals, etc. 
Unknowingly, the good old days were about to end as 
project managers saw the safety folks as an independent 
bunch that "needed some learnin" in principles of 
corporate finance. Unfortunately, a few project 
managers didn't read the paragraph in the NASA Policy 
Directive that requires safety approval of payloads. 
As hard as we tried (and seriously, we did), the past 
user-friendly, flexible, trust-me, teamwork approach 
wasn't getting the results that it once did during the era 
of Air Force assistance and larger safety staffs. 
Reluctantly (it was an impact on us, too) we started to 
really push the implementation of NASA-STD 8719.8, 
requiring new program introductions, regularly 
scheduled PSWG meetings, firm submittal dates for 
safety data packages - the requirements to ensure that 
we received the stacks of safety data we needed. Then 
the name calling began (a little nastier than 'lions, and 
tigers, and bears'), but our firm stand resulted in some 
slow improvements. 
Who knows when or if we would have ended up at 
Emerald City, as we were certainly on the road to 
Abilene. Fortunately, the road divided with a sign 
pointing toward CALIPSO. Maybe a bit of a long way 
off (as the distance conversion was verified by the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory), but still 'close enough for 
government work'. Suddenly, our wishes and dreams 
came true and we received more management support 
and assistance than ever thought possible (thanks to Dr. 
Laurence J. Peter). 
1.2 Program Establishment 
Without getting into the technical issues, safety 
requirements, or management issues of CAL[PSO, it was
really a blessing in disguise. CALIPSO motivated safety 
personnel and agency and center management to work 
together as a team to define short-teim solutions, realize 
that indeed, programmatic issues existed, and develop 
liiei:iif ôlifô sniflong-standi iblii1 
After CALIPSO, NASA quickly created a team that 
immediately identified the objectives, approach, 
processes, and requirements. Well, maybe not quickly, 
but it was the first step in resolving some of the issues 
that evolved since the release of NASA-STD 8719.8 and 
the lessons learned from CALIPSO. 
CALIPSO raised some specific problem areas that 
needed resolution. They included: 
•	 Complicated roles for projects involving multiple

NASA Centers 
• Dealing with projects that involved international 
partners 
• Lack of an approval process for the use and re-flight 
of a common spacecraft bus 
•	 Lack of a process for resolving dissenting opinions 
within NASA and with external organizations 
• Lack of acceptance of external approving authority 
and requirements 
From these issues, an approach was identified: 
• Build on the current PSWG approach and augment as 
needed to address lessons learned 
• Develop a new NASA ELV Payload Safety Program 
(PSP) to: 
- Establish and maintain NASA ELV payload 
safety policy, roles and responsibilities, and 
associated requirements 
- Ensure consistent interpretation of safety 
requirements 
- Define and oversee implementation of the 
safety review process 
- Provide payload projects with training, tools, 
and guidance	 - 
- Identify the decision making authorities 
• Develop a formaiprocesses for: 
- Resolving differences within the PSWGs: 
- Variance approval 
• Enhance and formalize key partnerships (e.g., Air 
Force and other ranges, commercial launch service 
providers, etc.) 
2. ELV Payload Safety Program Scope 
In NASA-STD 8719.8, the focus of the requirements 
concentrated on the approval of the safety data package
to obtain approval for processing at the launch site and 
subsequent launch. Obviously, to meet the agency 
safety (and mission success objectives) the scope of the 
program had to be increased to address the complete 
lifecycle. Antliless would result in a program with 
gaps, or an approach where safety is only selectively 
implemented. To achieve a robust program, the NASA-
STD 8719.8 scope was expanded to include systems 
safety participation in such areas as contracts and safety 
requirements identification, design, assembly, 
integration and test at NASA facilities, pre-launch 
processing and launch site operations, and planned 
recovery of capsules and sample return. This is in 
keeping with the similar lifecycle philosophy of MIL-
STD 882. 
2.1 Program Organization and Structure 
When originally discussed, one option considered was 
adopting a 'panel' type structure, similar to the Shuttle 
Flight Review Panel. This would certainly accomplish 
the objectives and provide the benefit of a strong, 
authoritative panel, but the cost to support such an 
organizational structure was deemed a prohibiting factor. 
In addition, the added complexity of multiple launch 
vehicles and launch sites would increase the complexity 
of support required. The approach finally adopted was 
to keep the successful structure of the PSWG intact as 
defined in NASA-STD 8719.8. The PSWG members 
would continue to support mission safety activities 
through better defined roles, and to provide the agency 
perspective, an ELV Payload Safety Program Manager 
and an Agency Team, was identified by NASA 
Headquarters (HQ) Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (OSMA). The agency team and program 
manager will provide support to the PSWG, and to 
ensure agency objectives are met, facilitate center and 
agency communications. 
The core agency team representatives will come from 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight 
Center, and KSC, with specific roles and responsibilities 
should be defined. This cross-section of centers will 
provide varied perspectives (and agendas), and should 
facilitate the exchange of information between centers 
for current and future missions. 
The agency team will support the program in two 
phases. The first phase consists of a development phase 
where the program activities, requirements, and 
processes are developed and finalized. The follow-on 
phase, the implementation phase, is where the program-
defined requirements and activities are instituted, with
the agency team acting to ensure that program/agency 
objectives are met. 
One of the misconceptions that needs to be addressed is 
that the PSWG is 'certifies' the safety of the payload. 
This is really done by the project office safety engineer. 
The PSWG provides a top level assessment to ensure the 
safety in their limited areas of authority. Many project 
managers think they have a 'safe' payload because the 
PSWG provides approval, but in reality the burden falls 
upon the payload center Safety and Mission Assurance 
Office to ensure the appropriate review for the entire 
lifecycle. 
2.2	 Program NASA Procedural Requirements
Development 
The policy establishing the protection of the public, 
workforce and assets of NASA ELV payloads is defined 
in NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.3, 
NASA General Safety Program Requirements. This 
NPR also defines the HQ level responsibilities 
associated with the program. As stated earlier, the 
program activities include the development of a new 
NPR that will supersede NASA-STD 8719.8 and define 
the	 program,	 operating	 structure,	 roles	 and 
responsibilities, processes, 	 and technical	 safety
requirements. 
A major area of concern was the lack of NASA ELV 
payload safety design requirements. As nearly all 
NASA ELV payloads are launched from Air Force 
Ranges, the Eastern and Western Range (EWR) 
Requirement 127-1 (superseded by Air Force Space 
Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710), was 
specified by NASA as the applicable safety requirement 
document for all flight hardware, ground support 
equipment, and operations conducted on Air Force 
property. At times, there are concerns that it is difficult 
to enforce requirements that NASA does not 'own', or 
that the Air Force is queried for requirement 
interpretations for NASA programs. 
These concerns will be alleviated by the development of 
technical safety requirements for NASA ELV payloads. 
The safety requirements will be based upon Air Force 
requirements, but will be tailored for payloads and 
include any NASA requirements that are more stringent 
or unique, and lessons learned. AFSPCMAN 91-710 
was chosen as the baseline for the NASA requirements, 
because of its strong heritage, the mandatory compliance 
document for launches, and as wise man (me) one said,
Hardware is dumb; it doesn't care what it's flying on or 
where, the hazards on the ground are all the same.". 
In addition to safety design_requirements, applicable 
operational safety requirements are required. Disparity 
exists between centers' requirements and these 
differences become apparent especially when hardware 
is transferred to another center for additional integration 
and test, or to the launch site for pre-launch processing. 
A common core of operational safety requirements 
would ensure safer, seamless operations with fewer 
confusion and delays. 
3. Program Elements 
From these objectives, the specific elements of the 
existing process were reviewed to identify the areas 
which required enhancing or supplementing to ensure 
that the agency objectives were reflected in the PSP. 
The following sections identify the areas addressed, 
options considered, actions proposed, and the expected 
results. 
3.1 Contract Assessment and Requirements 
identification 
These activities require a thorough identification of 
compliance requirements, standards, and codes to ensure 
that all applicable safety requirements necessary for 
payload safety are incorporated into the contracts and 
agreement(s). These requirements encompass all safety 
activities and should address flight hardware systems, 
ground support equipment, facilities, institutional safety, 
applicable launch range safety requirements, etc. 
Experience has shown that failure to identify applicable 
safety requirements for inclusion into contracts results in 
flight hardware design paths being taken that may result 
in costly redesign and/or risk to personnel or hardware. 
Related to requirement identification is a review of the 
contractual requirements. NASA occasionally enters 
into unique contractual agreements including grants or 
cooperative agreements. These agreements sometime 
impair the ability to impose the appropriate safety 
requirements, or prevent the required changes to achieve 
compliance to safety requirements. These contracting 
arrangements effectively 'tie the hands' of a safety 
office, and could result in project and safety risks.
3.2 Systems Safety Program Plan 
The Systems Safety Program Plan (SSPP) defines the 
payload project__office safety organization, roles, 
responsibility, authority, lines of communication, and 
interfaces with other disciplines both internal and 
external to the mission. NASA-STD 8719.8 previously 
specified only external (PSWG) review of the document, 
not approval. As this document can be considered as a 
contract between the payload safety office and the 
payload project that defines the function and support 
provided to the project and how the PSP objectives will 
be met, approval of this document will now be required. 
An important change to the SSPP coptents will be the 
increased emphasis on how the safety activities are 
integrated throughout the project lifecycle. This is the 
result of PSP's expansion of the safety review activities, 
and problems with past SSPPs where roles and 
responsibilities were undefined, such as during certain 
project phases or integrated activities. 
The timing of the submittal and approval of the SSPP 
will also be better defined. The importance of safety 
participation at the beginning of a mission cannot be 
over emphasized, and a sound plan is needed to guide 
the safety activities. Without a complete and robust 
safety process identified and implemented early, this too 
may jeopardize project goals and safety activities. 
3.3 Requirements Tailoring 
'Tailoring' is probably one of the least understood, most 
ignored and abused, but most beneficial process to the 
project and safety authorities. Tailored safety 
requirements result from the process of reviewing 
requirements to ensure the applicability and compliance 
by the project, as written, or whether the project will 
achieve an equivalent level of safety through an 
acceptable alternative requirement. 
The tailoring process is performed to aid in the 
interpretation of requirements and identify potential non-
compliances; this facilitates the early resolution of issues 
to reduce risk, enhance safety, and minimizes impact to 
project. 
Tailoring is not a unilateral activity. The project office 
safety engineer should prepare a draft in coordination 
with payload systems engineers. This draft is reviewed 
by all PSWG members for their respective areas of 
responsibility to:
•	 Identify applicable requirements -- NASA, Range 
Safety, other Government and consensus standards 
• Document the interpretation of requirements or 
applicability of a requirement to a specific mission 
activity 
•	 Implement lessons-learned as applicable 
•	 Consolidate interim policy/guidance/requirements 
•	 Document the rationale for addition/deletion/ 
change in requirements 
The resulting tailored requirements become the safety 
requirements for that project, therefore it is important 
that tailoring is performed early, so design and 
operations can implement the safety requirements; 
accurately, to ensure safety and project goals are 
achieved; and consistently, to meet the PSP objectives. 
In the past, some tailoring efforts took the approach of a 
'compliance checklist', resulting sometimes in 
combinations of undefined requirements, key 
requirements being deleted, and requirements incorrectly 
interpreted. Alternative approaches have been poorly 
documented, not documented, or accepted with a higher 
risk without assessments or management acceptance of 
risk. 
If the proper proposed programmatic changes to the 
tailoring process are incorporated, substantial 
improvements should result. Specific milestones are 
defined for the tailoring activity. The formatlprocess for 
tailoring will be defined, and rationale provided for any 
change, with a risk statement and assessment provided or 
referenced. As the tailoring is actually a modification to 
a NASA Procedural Requirement, it will be reviewed by 
the agency team to ensure that the correct interpretations 
of requirements have been documented, alternative 
approaches provide an equivalent level of safety truly do 
not increase risk, and adequate rationale is provided. 
A review by the agency team will provide a consistent 
assessment for all agency payloads, and also provide 
insight into requirements that may be unclear or 
frequently misunderstood, or alternative approaches that 
should be incorporated in the baseline requirements. 
This review will also provide the agency team the 
opportunity to identify issues that may be applicable to 
other current or future projects. 
3.4 Project Safety Introduction 
The Payload Safety Introduction (PSI) is the fist formal 
meeting of the spacecraft team and the PSWG. While a 
requirement of NASA-STD 8719.8, its occurrence
varied, and at times was held after the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), if at all. This meeting provides 
the project team the opportunity to introduce their 
organization, describe their mission, hardware, and 
processing activities, and provide an initial hazard 
assessment of their hardware and operations. 
The PSP has clarified the requirements for the PSI to 
ensure that preliminary hazard identification and 
analyses, a draft systems safety program plan, and a draft 
of the requirements tailoring are provided for discussion 
at the PSI. 
The agenda of the PSI has also been expanded to include 
discussion of the following items: 
• Applicable compliance documents 
•	 Contractual requirements and relationships 
• Contingency Operations 
• Planned recovery activities 
• Pre-launch mishap response and reporting 
3.5 Safety Data Packages 
A Safety Data Package (SDP) is a data submittal that 
provides a detailed description of hazardous and safety 
critical flight hardware equipment, systems, components, 
and materials that comprise the payload. It includes 
hazard assessments, inhibits, and mitigations, and with 
data provided in hazard reports, the ground operations 
plan, and hazardous technical operating procedures, it is 
one of the media through which prelaunch safety 
approval is obtained. 
The SDP is the 'objective evidence' a PSWG utilizes to 
assess safety compliance, and is their only official source 
of information. Obviously, an accurate submittal of this 
data is essential to ensure that the safety community is 
aware of the hazards, concurs with the assessments and 
mitigations, and the risk or effect on personnel or 
resources in their specific areas of responsibility (i.e., 
launch vehicle, public safety, NASA resources, 
processing facility, etc.). 
Safety activities are especially important at the 
beginning of a project during the concept and 
development engineering phases. Without active safety 
participation, a path may be taken that could lead to a 
design burdened by safety requirements, or at the other 
extreme it could result in a design with unacceptable 
risk. To avoid these events, preparation, submittal, and 
review comments are linked to a project's PDR and 
CDR milestones.
The SDP not prepared or reviewed in conjunction with 
the design review milestone may have serious impact to 
the project including: 
• The potential of a safety issue being discovered 
late(r) in the safety review process and requiring 
corrective action 
• The project not being able to implement an optimum 
solution to resolve the safety issue (compromising 
engineering, science and/or safety) 
• The residual risk from any design change or 
mitigation may still result in a risk that is higher 
than desired 
• Cost and schedule impacts to the project to 
accommodate design reviews and changes, 
hardware re-work or software modifications, testing, 
procedural changes, waiver processing, and 
management briefings. 
Previously, submittal dates were poorly defined and the 
requirements for the number of submittals, content and 
required delivery dates were creatively interpreted. 
Payload project safety offices pointed to the systems 
engineers as the source of the problem, as systems 
engineers were busy preparing for the PDR/CDR, and 
could not provide the required support to safety. To be 
effective, safety must actively participate in the design 
assessments, and be synchronized with the project 
engineering tasks. Systems safety is not an after-the-fact 
activity; it is an activity that must be performed 
concurrently with engineering. It can't be 'designed-in' 
afterwards. 
In addition to the NASA-STD 8719.8 prescribed PDR, 
CDR, and 'final' submittals, an additional SDP submittal 
is being proposed post-CDR that would capture CDR 
changes and open comments from the Phase I and II 
submittals. 
While the post-CDR submittal may appear as an 
additional burden to the payload project, historically, a 
minimum of 4 submittals is typically required to fully 
address the PSWGs concerns. From a cost standpoint, 
there may be a slight increase due to an additional 
internal review cycle, but the total level of effort in 
compiling the project's SDPs would remain the same, as 
the data required overall does not change. Likewise, 
requiring SDPs to be submitted before the project 
milestones is the only way to ensure timely feedback to 
the project and avoid the previously mentioned impacts. 
The preparation cost of an additional SDP is 
insignificant cheap when contrasted with the expense of 
a major design change.
3.6 Design Review Presentations 
Safety compliance is a project management gate, and 
safety activities and issues are required to be presented at 
tli PDR and CDR by the pã34âãd dtiizátidii fêty 
engineer. Although NASA-STD 8719.8 identified 
specific topics to be presented at the design reviews, 
many presentations lacked substance and at times 
offered little more than the status of safety milestones. 
The PSP will require the following areas be presented at 
the PDR and CDR: 
• Summary of safety activities and reviews, with dates 
and overview of upcoming safety milestones 
• Summary of hazard reports and hazard resolutions 
• Overview of non-compliances and potential safety 
issue 
One alternative considered would have the individual 
sub-system engineers address the safety aspects of their 
systems in their presentations, in lieu of the project 
office safety engineer providing a summary. A benefit 
would be that the sub-system engineers would be more 
conscious of the safety requirements and implementation 
in their designs. 
3.7 Phase III Payload Safety Review Presentation 
The Phase III Payload Safety Review Presentation is a 
new initiative instituted to provide a summary review of 
safety activities prior to the pre-ship review. The project 
office safety engineer will present to the PSWG and 
agency team the following: 
• A summary of safety activities and reviews, and the 
status of any in-process safety related work 
• An overview of non-compliances and risks 
• Verification that all safety requirements and 
activities have been met, or review of the plan(s) to 
bring the project into compliance 
• Status of safety verification tracking log items 
• The Certificate of ELV Payload Safety Compliance 
3.8 Certificate of ELV Payload Safety Compliance 
Although 8719.8 required a documented, coordinated 
approval from the PSWG, this rarely happened. PSWG 
members would provide individual approvals, at a 
schedule that coincided with their mission support 
milestones. In addition, a PSWG member approval did 
not always identify the scope of their approval or 
authority. This of course was confusing to project
managers, as they were unsure of the number of 
approvals they needed, or would receive. Occasionally, 
it also led to subtle pressure by project managers against 
a PSWG member that might still be trying to resolve a 
- fet,' cèin 
The revised process will consolidate the PSWG 
approvals through a certificate of compliance, with the 
goal of approval prior to the pre-ship review. 
3.9 Dissenting Opinions 
NASA-STD 9719.8 did not establish a formal voting 
process to resolve payload safety issues that had reached 
a stalemate within the PSWG. PSWG members always 
operated under the premise that all members would 
reach a unanimous position, or work until one was 
achieved. CALIPSO was the first mission where the 
PSWG could not reach agreement, and the need for a 
process to elevate and resolve dissenting opinions was 
evident. 
New program requirements will specify that a dissenting 
opinion from a PSWG member can be brought forward 
to the agency team. If necessary, the agency team will 
use independent resources such as subject matter experts 
to guide the determination. If the agency team also 
cannot reach a consensus, or provide a solution to satisfy 
a dissenting PSWG member, the issue will be further 
elevated to HQ OSMA. 
The agency team will rely upon the PSWG to raise any 
issues of concern before prolonged discussion occurs, or 
where an impasse is expected, and long before a critical 
milestone. The agency team will provide support and 
recommendations to the PSWG, and also advise HQ 
OSMA if a potential controversy appears to exist. 
3.10 Training 
NASA Standard 8719.8 never prescribed required 
training, nor was training for compliance to the Standard 
or its elements ever developed. Previously 'training' 
consisted of a short presentation at the PSI, primarily 
identifying roles, responsibilities, and description of the 
required data submittals. 
Two training classes are being proposed. A shorter 
version will have a target audience of NASA center and 
spacecraft contractor project managers, spacecraft 
systems engineers, safety and mission assurance 
directors and managers, and mission integration 
managers. The focus of the training will be toward
roles, responsibilities, and processes. A longer class 
will provide greater detail in these areas and more 
specific instruction with respect to the required safety 
data submittals. This class will be aimed to PSWG 
ñbé1 áffd ifi eiigiiiee: 
The PSP will also define minimum experience 
requirements for project safety personnel. Payload 
project office safety engineers will be expected to have 
the required systems safety engineering training, and 
will be required to have on-the-job experience assisting 
in a previous mission, before being the lead of a mission 
under the watchful eye of an experienced project office 
safety engineer. 
4. Program Development Lessons Learned 
Lessons learned is a misnomer because every new 
initiative probably reflects on decisions made in the 
same areas of communication, adequate funding or 
resources, and planning and scheduling. Then there are 
some circumstances that even the Wizard couldn't fix, 
but a few suggestions: 
Apply a systems engineering approach. Issues and 
potential resolution should be defmed in an 
increasingly greater level of detail, with stakeholder 
buy-in obtained at each phase. Issues/actions should 
be well defined, documented, prioritized, and 
dispositioned through a logical, integrated process. 
The time taken to clearly define in detail the 
approach and actions would have saved much time 
in the disposition of comments, clarifying incorrect 
assumptions, recalling the rationale for past changes 
and decisions, re-formulating, and writing of 
requirements. 
Process changes are best implemented in phases. 
Beta testing of portions of the process would have 
provided confirmation of the validity of approaches 
and provide opportunity to adjust. Easy 'fixes' 
should be implemented on an interim basis; it would 
provide a sense of accomplishment for team, and 
address current issues now. Phasing-in changes also 
prevents an overload during implementation, and 
early success makes the team more receptive to 
additional changes. 
• Continually review program objectives and original 
lessons learned, and periodically assess to ensure 
that objectives are being met. Changing the scope 
or dismissing a previous objective because a hard
decision is required doesn't make a problem 
disappear. 
Be realistic and honest in planning, scheduling and 
coiiiii, áiTd iti 5f ,'5üi öik 
Processes that are developed might look good on 
paper, but they have to survive the real world and 
'human factors'. 
Avoid new inventions; systems safety wasn't 
discovered yesterday. Try to employ proven 
processes and common requirements and apply 
them to all activities - Not only is hardware dumb, 
it has no sense of direction. Selective application of 
requirements doesn't solve problems, they just 
occur somewhere else. 
5. Summary 
While NASA-Standard 8719.8 provided instruction that 
facilitated the safe processing of scores of NASA ELV 
payloads, the evolution of the industry and agency 
concerns necessitated an expansion of policy scope, 
activities, and requirements to achieve the intended 
goals. 
Clarification and formalization of existing requirements 
for day-to-day project activities will help achieve the 
goals. Well-defined roles, responsibilities, and 
requirements will reduce confusion and provide a more 
effective safety process for the projects. The broader 
agency goals of consistent interpretation and 
implementation of requirements and processes should be 
achieved through the creation of the program and 
utilization of the new agency team. 
Collectively, these programmatic changes should result 
in a significant improvement of the safety of NASA 
ELV Payloads.
